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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of the Nigeria labour movement in the struggles for 
democratic restoration in Nigeria. The paper shows that the Nigerian labour is a 
forerunner of socio-economic and pro-democracy struggles in the country, providing the 
foundation for efflorescence civil society. The paper shows that the state played a key 
role in reproducing socio-economic and political inequality and generating, in the 
process, anti-state, anti-hegemonic activity from trade unions and other associational 
groups. In response to anti-state activities, the state intervened in the internal politics of 
these organisations. Where necessary, the state invented repressive laws to impose 
“order”. In confronting difficult circumstances created by the repressive state – structural 
adjustment, retrenchment and militarism – the Nigerian labour movement demonstrated 
both organisational strength and weakness, whilst also forging difficult alliances in 
confronting a common enemy – the state. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Nigeria labour movement is often described as the “veteran” of democratic struggle 
in the country. It spearheaded the struggles, and endured stiff repression from the state, 
particularly in the early days of the struggle (1970s-1990s) when the state was still under 
military control. Indeed, the history of Trade Union movement in Nigeria and elsewhere 
is closely knit with the struggles for democratic values such as human rights, welfare, 
wage, equal franchise. However, because of its ideological stance as the defender of 
workers’ right, the labour movement is often neglected when it comes to discourses on 
democratic struggles.  This paper aims to rescue the “veteran” image of the Nigeria 
labour movement in the country’s history of democratic struggles. 
 
                                                
1 Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kuridstan-Hawler. Email: 
usmantar@ukh.ac. This is a revised version of paper for Workshop on Democracy and Working Class Struggles 
in Africa, Department of Applied Social Science, London Metropolitan University, Ladbroke House, 
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Democracy in Africa (Tar, 2009). I am grateful to Professor John Gabriel, Shiraz Durrani and other 
participants for their constructive feedback.. 
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The paper will broadly examine the conceptual discourses on civil society, state and 
democracy. This will be followed by a historical-descriptive analysis of the Nigeria labour 
movement and democratic struggles. The paper is divided into four broad parts. The 
second part of the paper deals with conceptual issues. The third part deals with the 
labour and democratic struggles. The final part offers some conclusive remarks. 
 
Civil Society, state and democracy – conceptual issues    
 
There is need to understand the concepts of the state, civil society and democracy with a 
view to comprehending the function of structure (state) and agency (civil society) in 
impacting political ends (democracy). The state is defined as an entity with a defined 
population, territory and monopoly of sovereignty, elaborate government, security and 
diplomatic structures arguably capable of providing welfare, security, unity and equity of 
its citizens. Above all, it is distinguished by its ideal attribute of providing a legitimate 
space for power struggles and, formal structures that lay claims to democratic principles, 
political participation, etc. Yet in practice, such ideal capacities become subject to 
contestation between and among its leaders and constituent elements – a key focus of 
this research (Crompton and Scott, 2000). The state is assumed to be represented by the 
dominant political class and institutional gatekeepers. It is not an abstract term; rather, an 
objective reality representing specific classes and interests. In its relation with “civil 
society”, the state is adjudged by the visions and actions of its “gatekeeper” institutions 
and ruling political classes.  
 
The state is conceived as an institution whose character and behaviour are defined by the 
conflicting interests and agency of the political beings inhabiting it (see e.g. Beckman 
1982; Osoba 1978; Forrest 1987, etc.). Beckman’s thesis, written in the context of power 
and state-building in Nigeria, seems to convey the key defining character of the state: the 
state promotes the interest of the ruling class and its metropolitan paymasters – that is, 
the ruling classes of industrial economies to which the former is beholden (Beckman 
1982: 45).2 At issue is the fact that the state is first and foremost an agency in the hands 
of the ruling classes who manipulate it in achieving desired objectives. Thus, phenomena 
such as democracy and development are at the mercy of dominant, albeit conflicting, 
political interests of the ruling classes. By implication, given that it represents the interest 
of ruling political oligarchies, the state is insensitive to the wishes and aspirations of the 
society. This explains why since independence, state policies only seek to promote the 
conflicting interests of the ruling class.  
 
On the other hand, the term “civil society” is broadly defined as the participatory space 
between the formal apparatus of the state and informal settings of families and atomised 
individuals, where groups emerge to forge associational ties, articulate interests and 
participate in public affairs. Much has been written on the concept, yet it remains one of 
the most controversial concepts in social science (see Herbeson, Rothchild and Chazan, 
1994; Hearn, 2001). There are debates between “Western” liberal and alternative 
                                                
2  Beckman advanced three sets of arguments, each relevant in its own right, but endorsed the third, holistic, one: (1) 
the Nigerian state as an organ of domestic bourgeoisie (i.e. the local ruling classes); (2) the Nigerian state as an organ of 
international capital (i.e. foreign capitalist states, classes and institutions); (3) the Nigerian state as an organ of capital in 
general. In endorsing the third argument, Beckman notes: ‘while the Nigerian state serves as an organ both for the 
penetration of international capital and for the emancipation of the domestic bourgeoisie, it cannot be reduced to 
either. Nor is it possible to comprehend the significance of either of the two aspects without examining such class 
functions of the Nigerian state for which the distinction between foreign and domestic is not relevant. The primary 
role of the Nigerian state is to establish, maintain, protect and expand the conditions of capitalist accumulation in 
general without which neither foreign nor Nigerian capital can prosper’ (Beckman 1982: 45).  
167 |                                                              I n f o r m a t i o n ,  S o c i e t y  &  J u s t i c e  
 
constructions as well as between idealistic and realistic viewpoints. Whilst the term 
appears to be too vague and vast, it makes better sense if it is used in a specific context 
and streamlined to specific organisations within it. Therefore, in the context of this 
paper, civil society is limited to specific associations, particularly those struggling for 
democracy: pro-democracy groups, civil associations, professional associations, labour 
union (my focus in this paper is on labour unions, with reference to its relations with the 
state and other groups).  
 
The labour movement is thus an integral part of “civil society” as defined above. The 
term “labour movement” is interchangeably used with “organised labour” and “trade 
unions” to refer to associations of wage labourers formed for the purposes of promoting 
and protecting workers’ interests and welfare against employers. As will be revealed in 
this study, in Nigeria, the rise of labour struggles and, indeed, other associational entities, 
is closely rooted in the process of colonial conquest, and dependent capitalist state and 
class formation. Traditionally, trade unions emerge as sites for promoting better 
conditions of work for their members through the usual channels of industrial relations 
and collective bargaining – union–management negotiations, work stoppages, militant 
strike actions, etc. However, in the context of Nigeria and indeed other developing 
societies, the petty-bourgeois-dominated state – often the dominant employer of labour – 
emerges as a protagonist of capital, local and international, little concerned with the 
conditions of labour. Hence, in addition to workplace struggles, trade unions are known 
for participating actively in wider socio-economic and political struggles, in particular, in 
contesting unpopular state policies and making demands for democratic change. This is 
obviously because the broad constituency which the Labour movement claims to 
represent – workers and masses – are often at the receiving end of those policies, which 
makes it necessary to organise and challenge them.  
  
 
Finally, an analysis of the role of labour movement in democratic struggles requires a 
grasp of the meaning of democracy – one of the most contested concepts in Social 
Sciences. Democracy is defined as an institutional arrangement that involves open 
political competition, multi-party participation, legally sanctioned political rights, a 
mechanism for ensuring the transparent conduct of public affairs, all mediated by 
periodic elections where citizens elect, re-elect or depose their representatives. By 
extension, “democratisation” refers to institutional and attitudinal transformations aimed 
at providing maximum democratic rights and institutions for the people. It depends 
largely on dialogue and negotiation as well as actions and reactions (protests, policies, 
programmes, etc.) of citizens aimed at influencing the choices and behaviour of state 
institutions and actors. Also, democracy carries the potential for alternating governments. 
In this study, the emphasis is on liberal democracy,3 not least because it constitutes the 
recurrent political system (alternating with military regime) instituted in post-colonial 
Nigeria. Nigeria has never practised socialist democracy, even though it has often been 
advocated by some segments of the population, in particular students, workers, teachers 
and a radical “minority” in the military. The only time Nigeria fortuitously came close to 
adopting socialist democracy was in 1986 when a Political Bureau appointed by the 
government of General Babangida recommended social democracy, in conformance with 
                                                
3  Adam Przeworski defines liberal democracy as ‘a procedural system involving open political competition, with 
multi-party, civil and political rights guaranteed by law, and accountability operating through an electoral relationship 
between citizens and their representatives’ (Przeworski 1991: ix). The core substance of liberal democracy is 
competitive electoral politics involving, on the one hand, regular, open and competitive elections whose outcome 
is ‘uncertain [and] indeterminate ex ante’ (Przeworski, op cit) and, on the other, a periodic machinery for making 
popular choices with the widest possible provisions for popular participation. 
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overwhelming public support. This too was ostensibly rejected by the Western-
influenced military ruling class. 
 
The Nigerian Labour Movement: Emergence and Struggles  
 
The Nigerian Labour movement is closely associated with the process of class formation 
and, in particular, “proletarianisation” in the country (Barchiesi, 1996; Tar, 2006: Chapter 
4). Workers had to develop a united front to confront and engage the exploitative 
excesses of owners of capital. The process started in colonial era, but was carried forward 
to the post-colonial era. The emergence of industries and bureaucracy led to the rise of 
migrant wage labour and it became necessary for workers to organise and protect their 
interests. By the turn of the 20th Century, a number of unions had emerged, particularly 
amongst railway men, teachers and factory workers, to advance the interest of wage 
labourers - key examples include the Nigeria Civil Service Union (NCSU) founded in 
1912; the Nigeria Union of Teachers (NTC) formed in 1931; and the Railway Workers’ 
Union, (RWU) founded in 1931. These unions contributed to the struggle for 
independence, alongside other indigenous groups. Throughout the post-independence 
period, the labour movement has been at the forefront of workers’ struggles and anti-
state movement – a key rationale for the military state to intervene in the reorganisation 
and control of the labour. 
 
In 1978, the military state imposed a Decree which sought ostensibly to amalgamate 
hitherto acrimonious trade unions into a single labour federation, the Nigeria Labour 
Congress (NLC). Apparently, and for obvious reasons, the Decree aimed to contain 
labour struggle and radicalism: first, the Nigerian state acquired a stake in the labour 
sector being the highest employer of labour. Second, the petty-bourgeois political class 
(and its foreign capitalist financiers) have a vested interest in capitalist accumulation 
which they often promote through the state’s instrument of coercion and labour 
regulation. Nevertheless,  
while it has had its own problems, and while military rule has seriously mediated 
its influence and autonomy, the labour movement remained one of the most 
persistent opponents of military rule in Nigeria. For this posture it suffered 
proscription, government intervention in its affairs, the promulgation of 
draconian decrees and edicts regulating union activities (Ihonvbere, 1997: 80).  
 
The Nigerian labour movement endured years of sustained repression particularly during 
military era when the state took punitive measure to rein in workers protests and 
struggles for socio-economic and political justice. As further noted by Adesina, 
“organised labour in Nigeria had since 1940s developed a reputation for militant defence 
of workers’ rights and policy advocacy in issues that concern the working people – even 
if fractiously so” (2000: 143).  
 
Organisational Structure  
 
The Nigeria labour movement is led by the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) which as we 
have seen, was formally constituted as a single federation of trade unions in 1978. Its 
mission is generously radical and ambitious:  
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to organise, unionise and educate all categories of Nigerian workers; defend and 
advance the political, economic, social and cultural rights of Nigerian workers; 
emancipate and unite Nigerian workers and people from all forms of exploitation 
and discrimination; achieve gender justice in the work place and in NLC; 
strengthen and deepen the ties and connections between Nigerian workers and 
the mutual/natural allies in and outside Nigeria and lead the struggle for the 
transformation of Nigeria into a just, humane and democratic society.4 
 
NLC has developed “as the sole national labour centre” with a strong membership base 
over 1,000 national industrial unions and state councils (Beckman, Akwetey and 
Lindström, 2000: 25). Before the emergence of NLC, there were four labour centres: the 
Nigeria Trade Union Congress (NTUC), Labour Unity Front (LUF), United Labour 
Congress (ULC) and Nigeria Workers’ Council (NWC), each with several affiliated 
unions. Relations between these labour federations were highly acrimonious during the 
colonial era but compounded in the decades following independence. When it came to 
confronting the state and/or employers, these federations exhibited both unity and 
disunity.  
 
With a membership of about 4 million and spanning Nigeria’s public and private sectors, 
NLC emerged as the key labour organisation in post-colonial Nigeria, representing 10 
percent of Nigeria’s total labour force (an estimated 50 million).5 It has 29 affiliate unions 
and 37 state councils – each affiliate also has a corresponding structure at the 
industrial/state levels. There is “internal politics” both within NLC and between its 
affiliated unions. Given Nigeria’s oil economy, oil sector unions have been more 
assertive and stronger compared to non-oil sector unions. This became apparent in the 
aftermaths of the annulment of June 12 1993 Presidential Elections, when the National 
Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN) complemented NLC’s anti-
military and democratic struggles, when the NLC national executive was infiltrated by 
state influence. Ihonvbere (1997) notes these oil-sector unions coordinated series of 
industrial actions which brought the Nigerian economy to a halt, demanding the military 
to withdraw from power and restore democratic system. Similarly, compared to NLC’s 
northern branches, those in the industrialised southern part of the country have 
demonstrated a more resilient anti-statist profile, particularly in the post-1993 period. 
 
Given the potential strength of the labour movement in Nigeria, the state has long 
sought to control it. In 1978 the military regime of General Obasanjo brought the four 
labour federations together into the single Nigerian Labour Congress, under state 
domination. Since then, it sought to stop the formation of unions in key strategic sectors. 
For instance, successive Trade Union Decrees have excluded military and para-military 
personnel as well as some public sector establishments (designated as “essential 
                                                
 
4 NLC “History of the NLC” Available: http://www.nlcng.org/PROFILE/historyofcongress.htm. 
 
5 NLC “Policy on NLC and Unionism”, available: 
http://www.nlcng.org/PROFILE/policyonunionism.htm.  
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services”6) from forming industrial unions, let alone joining the NLC – this is reinforced 
by the Essential Services Decree of 1977 which states that these organisations cannot 
form labour unions or participate in industrial action. Paradoxically, the state failed in its 
bid to declare the Nigerian oil sector as an “essential service” or stop oil sector workers 
from joining the labour – as it previously did in the education sector through the 
Teaching etc (Essential Services) of 1993 which effectively (but temporarily) banned the 
national union of university teachers, Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), and 
disaffiliated it from the NLC. 
 
Thus, the Nigerian labour movement comprises a variety of unions that represent the 
specific interest of workers. They engage in struggling for the rights and welfare of 
workers, in particular, for decent wages and improved conditions of service, where 
negotiations fail to achieve the desired result, labour unions are noted for resorting to 
militant action – such as stay at homes, work to rule, demonstrations and street protests – 
which are capable of not only grounding the particular production process but, 
sometimes and more crucially, the economy. Such struggles are directed at both private 
and public sector employers and at the state and its alliance of ruling classes who 
generally protect the interest of capital whilst seeking to regulate labour. Apart from 
struggling for workers’ welfare, most labour unions in Nigeria claim to represent the 
interests of the socially marginalised and oppressed segments of society, in particular, the 
masses and peasants who, like workers, are seen as standing at the receiving end of unjust 
state policies.  
 
Funding and Autonomy  
 
An independent and sustainable source of income is important for any organisation that 
seeks to fight against the state. This, unfortunately, proved in the Nigerian labour 
movement. In spite of its large membership and impressive profile of worker militancy 
and anti-state activism, the NLC lacks independent and sufficient sources of funding. 
There are two sources of funding, each controlled by either the state or the employer 
(public/private sector organisations). The first source is membership subscriptions, but 
these are normally collected by the employer and then handed over to the union 
leadership. The money is then shared between the national body and the local branch. 
The second source of funding is government subvention, which is common when the 
union is in serious financial crisis. Military regimes have exploited NLC’s paucity by 
underwriting its bankruptcy and awarding it monetary incentives in return for 
conformity. This has come close to regime “take over”. At the slightest of excuses, 
regimes have capitalised on NLC’s financial and other vulnerabilities to sack union 
leaders and appoint Sole Administrators under state orders. Regime interventions were 
often justified in terms of intra-union skirmishes, corruption etc, but in reality they were 
intended to contain dissent and ensure government control of the Congress.  
 
The Nigerian labour policy grant significant leverage to employers and the owners of 
capital. For instance, in times of industrial action, employers are empowered to withhold 
the collection and/or handing over of union dues to the union leadership, as a means of 
                                                
6 Examples include the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Nigeria Security Printing and Minting 
Company. Workers in these organisation are  forbidden from forming active industrial unions 
ostensibly because should they embark on a strike, the Nigerian economy will come to a stand-still. 
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compelling a return to work. This has often left union leaders with two stark choices: 
either to submit or to make do with no funds. Another key problem is the manner in 
which membership dues are spent which sparks-off issues of transparency and prudence. 
NLC leaders are often accused of financial impropriety, leading to disunity and lack of 
trust, especially within local branches. This creates opportunities for the state to 
intervene 
 
NLC’s so-called socialist stance, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, had affected its 
capacity to obtain external funding. At the peak of the military era when the state was 
implementing western structural adjustment programme, the NLC was branded an anti-
capitalist organisation, effectively serving as an evidence to exclude it from western 
donor funding. Until recently, the NLC and, in particular, manual workers, have not been 
beneficiaries of foreign donors, who viewed them, particularly in the 1980s and 90s, as a 
“radical”, “socialist” or “anti-capitalist” force (see Adesina, 2000: 515). Because donors 
channelled their resources to civic associations, one way in which labour activists tried to 
overcome this was through networking with civic associations or forming new 
organisations under union control. Following Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, the 
NLC allied with some civic associations and became part of joint bids for donor funds. 
For instance, during the 2003 elections, the NLC’s flagship network, the Civil Society 
pro-Democracy Network (CSPN), was granted funding by the EU, the United Nations’ 
Development Programme and the National Endowment for Democracy. Donor funding 
has enabled the NLC overcome its over-dependence on the scarce membership dues and 
state subvention. However, as expected, donor funding carried serious implications in 
terms of their capacity for autonomous action.  
 
Internal Democracy 
 
On face value, the NLC demonstrates an elaborate organisational framework which 
seeks to accommodate the diverse interests of its members and affiliates. As a large-scale 
organisation, it has been prone to conflict and fragmentation. At the topmost level, there 
is the National Delegates’ Conference (NDC), which brings together delegates from all 
industrial unions affiliated to the NLC and which takes crucial decisions on constitutional 
matters. A highlight of the NDC is the election of a new executive who run the congress 
for two years. The second organ is the National Executive Council (NEC) charged with 
the responsibility of formulating key decisions and policies of the union. Members of the 
NEC represent the NLC in industrial negotiations and collective bargaining with 
employers and the state. The Central Working Committee (CWC), a third organ, is 
charged with “strategic” responsibility, in particular, the planning and staging of 
industrial action. The National Administrative Council (NAC) oversees the 
administrative matters of the union. Finally, a Secretariat, headed by a General Secretary 
(GS), is responsible for the daily operations of Congress and executes policies and 
decisions of organs. Deputy and Assistant General Secretaries (DGS & AGS) oversee 
specific departments7 which are run daily by paid professional staff.  
 
                                                
7 The Departments are: Education and International Affairs; Organisation, Industrial Relations and 
Gender; Research and Statistics; Administration and Establishment; and Finance.  
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A formal description of the organisational structure of the NLC reveals very little about 
the reality of internal democratic practice. Certain key factors adversely affect the NLC’s 
structure. First, by law, the state has substantial legal control over the union. These 
powers are granted by the Labour (and Associated Matters) Decree and the Trade 
Unions Decree which are regularly reviewed to reinforce the state’s powers. With these 
legal powers, the state can legally intervene in the affairs of unions. This was a common 
practice in both military and democratic era, although it is more severe under the military 
who often employ punitive measure of arbitrary action against union activities – e.g. 
proscription of unions, detention of leaders/members etc. Second, at some points in 
time, particularly during national political crises, the NLC turns out to be politically 
divided and fragmented, with different state branches and members from different ethnic 
groups and regions supporting conflicting tendencies. Equally important, the NLC has 
struggled to combine and unite these tendencies. Third, too often the NLC is resource-
starved, leading to corrupt practices and internal crises. Finally, the space of autonomous 
and democratic action by the NLC is highly contingent, ranging from one political period 
to another. The NLC was more democratic during civilian phases of government (1960-
65; 1979-83; and 1999-date) and vice versa. For instance between 1979 and 1983, when 
the NLC witnessed a   great degree of autonomy, and was led by very popular unionists, 
there was a marked spirit of “solidarity” amongst members and democratic practice was 
regularly applied. Conversely, between 1985 and 1999, when Nigeria was under military 
rule, the NLC experienced the worst state of democratic practice. Even though state 
repression further agitated anti-state protest, it also diminished the space for autonomy 
and democratic action.  
 
The NLC carries a suspect democratic credentials. On the one hand, it seemed to operate 
fairly democratically, both nationally and in local branches – particularly in terms of 
regular elections, meetings, constitutionalism and due process. Regular meetings are held 
to discuss union and societal matters. Elections are held regularly in which members 
participate in electing local and national officials. Local representatives to the NDC and 
other national events are drawn from, and elected democratically in, local branches. The 
NLC has a constitution, which is reviewed regularly and forms the legal framework of 
the union. It has a website and in-house newsletter, the Labour News, distributed to 
members, even though the flow of information is hampered by a host of factors, ranging 
from apathy amongst members to lack of resources to maintain publication. This 
foregoing modest democratic performance is a recent development. In the past, both 
officials and members agreed that the NLC had its difficult times when elections were 
abused, few or single individuals controlled the union and meetings were rarely called.  
 
On the other hand, the NLC showed an inherent failure in the area of social inclusivity, 
especially of women and those from minority ethnic groups. In the case of women, a 
count of those currently in leadership position at the national level showed that out of 13 
officers, only two were women – this lack of inclusivity has also been the prevailing trend 
in most individual unions. Given that women constitute a significant proportion of 
Nigeria’s workforce and wider civil society struggles (International IDEA, 2000: 123), 
this distribution is indeed disproportionate.8 In other words, like other organisations in 
                                                
8 However, the NLC has initiated measures to improve women’s participation in the union. An example 
is the setting-up in 2003 of a Women’s Commission in the Congress and its state councils and 
affiliates. Moreover, in the last two decades, the activities of the women’s wing have expanded 
dramatically, especially in the area of education, internal agitation for reforms and advocacy. But these 
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Nigeria, the NLC is dominated by men. It is also weak in the area of consensus-building 
with members often divided by sectarian interests, in particular, religion, ethnic and 
regional differences. Another key problem of the NLC, until recently, was poor in 
maintaining transparency and accountability. Scandals involving the abuse of funds by 
union officials are common. Thus, the NLC cannot be said to be very democratic. This is 
confirmed by the NLC’s own self-criticism, which emerged in the context of a post-
military situation analysis:  
 Internal operations of the trade union movement in Nigeria give cause for great 
concern. Military rule and the attendant might-is-right ethos have impacted on civil 
society, including unions, occasioning some acute imitative militarism. Some of the 
worst manifestations in the movement can be seen in an officership culture that is 
not founded on principles of democracy and union rules and values. 
 
 Major decisions on policies are occasionally adopted without broad consultations or 
debates within the union and its various organs.  
 
 Harmony and synergy between union leadership and membership have in some 
cases been subverted by poor officership, involving no consultation and legitimacy. 
Thus, the membership is not able to own the union or its decisions and tends to be 
apathetic. 
 
 Observed lapses and sharp practice in relation to finances exact a heavy toll on 
resources and funds, with the attendant consequences of weakened capacity and 
trust. 
 
 Modes of internal communication are inadequate (NLC, 2006). 
 
However, while the lack of internal democracy constitutes a serious blow to claims of 
democratic struggle, the NLC does have the potential to generate worker and mass 
solidarity, in particular, to mobilise popular support for anti-state action. Aiyede argues 
that  
The labour movement owes its prominence less to its internal democratic 
structure or its technical capacity than to its ability to mobilise as a vehicle to 
create space for democratic debate and contestation, or even constrain the state, 
especially when the leadership is urged on by pressure from below (2004: 226) 
 
In spite of a strong profile of anti-statist, pro-worker and popular activism, the NLC has 
been “riddled with disunity, factional struggles and inter-union competition with 
consequences up to the present” (Barchiesi, 1996: 356). To be sure, the labour 
movement is relatively weak and fragmented, even though it is at the forefront of 
opposition against state policies (see next section). But fragmentation is context-specific: 
the reasons are found both within labour and in the state who continue to claim the 
monopoly of regulating labour. Within unions, internal conflicts and rivalries have 
resulted in dwindling, dividing and destabilising the NLC – this was apparent in times of 
national political crises, as examined below. On the other hand, successive governments 
                                                                                                                                       
measures are aimed at improving ‘participation’ rather than reversing the disproportionate leadership 
ratio. 
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have often exploited the NLC’s internal weakness: “civil and military regimes maintained 
an interest in fragmentation of the union movement [which increased] a general sense of 
distance and distrust between union activists and professional politicians” (Barchiesi, op 
cit). These problems are revealed in the dramas of labour-state relations which I examine 
below. 
 
Engaging the State: from welfare to democratic struggle  
 
The NLC is known for its “legendary” struggles for workers’ rights and welfare. But this 
struggle cannot be disconnected from a bevy of interconnected activities – not least 
democracy, accountability and individual liberty – as well as and actors such as pro-
democracy civic organisations. This proves that the NLC did not function in isolation: it 
has always forged alliances to promote its interest. In addition to the interest of labour 
workers, the NLC has always claimed to speak for other members of the Nigerian 
society. Thus, in addition to traditional workers’ struggles, and closely associated with 
them, the Nigerian labour movement has a strong profile of acting as a bulwark of 
opposition against the excesses of the state and unjust policies, and remained relatively 
strong and autonomous until the 1980s. This profile is closely linked to Nigeria’s 
relatively strong development of capitalism, especially the emergence of oil economy. 
Issa Aremu asserts that labour’s political autonomy is manifest in the following: “direct 
party formation”; its measured cooperation with the “progressive national bourgeoisie in 
an attempt to improve workers’ conditions”; and “contact with international communist 
movements which favoured the abolition of exploitation and the enthronement of a new 
social order”, even where such contacts were against the wishes of the ruling state actors 
(1997: 174). These assertive measures were strong indication of autonomous action.                    
 
Closely associated workers’ struggles, the NLC has been closely associated with party 
politics. The rationale for involvement in party politics is to build a united workers’ front 
for promoting and defending the partisan interests of labour workers. In Nigeria’s First 
Republic (1960-66), a section of the labour movement formed the Socialist Workers’ and 
Farmers’ Party (SWAFP) and the Nigerian Labour Party (NLP). In the aborted Third 
Republic, the NLC applied to the National Electoral Commission to register its own 
party, the National Labour Party (NLP) which was rejected. Currently, there is a 
movement within the NLC to revamp the NLP. Indeed, the NLC’s policy on politics 
states that: (1) Nigerian workers desired their own party  (2) Workers could be organised to 
create and develop their own party; (3) The leadership of a worker’s party must emerge 
from the ideologically most advanced, committed persons having their deep roots within 
the labour movement; (4) The party of the working class must have a program one distinct 
from all other parties; (5) The party of workers should be based on working class 
membership and should be sustained by workers, not by assistance, or “alliance” with 
segments of the ruling class etc.9 
 
In terms of engaging the state, the NLC united workers, especially in the 1980s and 90s 
against the tyranny of powerful political and economic classes, in particular military 
regimes. It also mobilised public opinion against the excesses of the state and its ruling 
                                                
9 See NLC “Labour Policy on Politics” available: http://www.nlcng.org/PROFILE/policyonpolitics.htm 
accessed 20th January 2006. 
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political classes on issues of workers and public welfare – health, education, security, 
energy etc as well as democratic change. In the process, the NLC encountered several 
frontlines, with success and failures. Below, I examine three contexts of the struggle. 
 
A classical example of labour-state stalemate is in terms of workers’ response to austerity 
and adjustment measures adopted by the state which “aggravated deterioration in the 
quality of life of workers” (Barchiesi, 1996: 362). For example, the Babangida regime 
aroused the expectation of workers by promising to abolish obnoxious anti-labour 
decrees promulgated by the preceding Buhari regime, expand the scope of workers’ 
freedom, increase their salaries and improve their material conditions. This was soon 
exposed as empty promise as the regime not only embarked on withdrawal of subsidies 
on basic products and retrenchment of workers in the public sector in keeping with IMF 
conditionalities, but promulgated more decrees to repress protesting workers, including 
one proscribing the NLC. Secondly, in the run up to the adjustment programme, the 
Babangida regime imposed on workers their own share of the adjustment, at a time when 
they could least afford it. In October 1985, the regime declared a National Economic 
Emergency which was to last for fifteen months. As part of the emergency, the regime 
announced massive pay cuts (between two and 20 percent) for public sector workers. 
The amount accruing from this deduction was to be paid in to the National Economic 
Recovery Fund (NERF). Jimi Adesina notes that  
this decision was made unilaterally and without consultation of any sort with the 
NLC or any other union within the trade union movement. Over the next three 
years the general impact of adjustment fell severely on the working people. The 
defence of the occupational and pecuniary interest of its members brought the 
Congress into ever more open confrontation with the regime (2000: 145).  
 
In 1987, NLC vigorously responded to General Babangida’s argument on the removal of 
the oil subsidy, defending its position with comparative international data of minimum 
wages and real income. A middle-aged male worker recalled his experience: 
We became one of the most pauperised segments of the society. Our salaries 
became very insufficient and were not reviewed despite several strikes, 
negotiations and agreements. The value of the Naira [Nigeria’s national currency] 
swiftly fell; so also were our income level, purchasing power and living standards. 
In short, we became poor, very poor and constant strike actions became the only 
way to channel our anger and demands (Interview, Maiduguri, 15th March 2003). 
The above deplorable existential conditions amongst workers contrasted sharply with the 
surreal life styles enjoyed by the ruling class elites and their cronies. Consider the 
following personal observation from a retired male activist, who saw “the transition of 
wage labourers from better off in the 1960s and 70s to wretched of the earth in the 80s 
and 90s”: 
At the peak of structural adjustment, top soldiers, contractors, and politicians 
were leading lavish lifestyles buying expensive clothing, houses and cars to 
themselves and their kids, displaying their wealth in the streets, travelling abroad 
for their shopping as well as patronising private social service. (health, security, 
water etc), because those provided by government have deteriorated. On the 
other hand, our condition worsened as our meagre earnings were squeezed out 
through obnoxious anti-worker policies and programmes (Interview, Lagos, 10th 
November 2003). 
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In essence, the whole situation was extremely desolate and created real pressure for mass 
protest led by workers. In a study on the impact of structural adjustment on occupational 
groups in Nigeria, Sina Kawonise and his colleagues concluded that “SAP, though in an 
inverse manner, did much to arouse the citizenry to political action” (1998: 56). As noted 
by Otobo (1992) “the build-up to the (third triennial delegates’ Conference at Benin) was 
largely influenced by events within the economy, notably the impact of the structural 
adjustment [programme], SAP on wage earners and citizenry in general, and the reaction 
of the NLC to these” (cited in Adesina, op cit): 
The NLC expressed contrary views to those of the government on practically all 
issues:…unilateral deduction from salaries of public servants in 1987; cost of 
living indices; the official claims of the “gains” of the structural adjustment 
policy; the exchange rates of the Naira; removal of petroleum subsidies; 
educational policies; human rights records; to political appointments (Otobo, 
1992, cited in Adesina op cit). 
The above position displeased the Babangida regime in no small measure. The regime 
adopted different measures in responding to workers’ protests and industrial action. 
First, it sought to neutralise the NLC itself. The 1988 NLC Delegates’ Conference 
provided a potential opening for this “game play”. In the election held at the conference, 
the regime put up a candidate for the NLC presidency, Mr Takai Shamang. He was 
woefully defeated, winning four votes as opposed to the winning candidate, Comrade Ali 
Chiroma’s two hundred and eighty votes. The regime’s candidates to other elective posts 
in the NLC suffered similar excruciating defeat, inviting an advanced, more decisive, 
phase of the “game play”. Adesina puts it better:  
The sealing of the NLC Secretariat by armed security personnel on Monday 29th 
February, marked a new shift in the government’s overt effort to rein-in the 
NLC. This was followed with the Babangida regime evoking the National 
Economic Emergency Powers Decree of 1985, and dissolving the leadership of 
the NLC. A sole administrator was appointed to run the affairs of the Congress 
(ibid, 145-5). 
Having succeeded in bringing the NLC under a pro-regime administration, the military 
sponsored a phoney election in which pro-regime candidate, Mr Pascal Bafyau, was 
handpicked by virtue of his status as a candidate acceptable to the regime, and on 30 
December, Bafyau and others were sworn in as elected NLC leaders. Despite the 
repressive manipulation, in February 1988, labour protest against workers’ deteriorating 
condition of living did not abate: if anything, the protests grew. Thus, in March/April, a 
series of strike actions staged by workers and students against increasing fuel prices 
compelled the government to negotiate with the same union leadership it dissolved six 
weeks earlier. Nevertheless, as noted by a former NLC activist, a man near retirement 
age:  
The regime’s mendacity to retain a discredited [NLC] leadership10, plus the 
hardships of SAP [structural adjustment programme] did not stop us from 
keeping the flag of strikes flying. We continued our strikes, which was more 
satisfying than returning to work with an empty stomach (Interview held in 
Abuja, 16th August 2003).    
                                                
10 The extent to which military-imposed NLC leadership was considered as anathema, was expressed 
by another observer: “The congress leadership was a bunch of military lackeys who had no affinity 
with principles, integrity and democracy…Congress [leadership] was a sell out, one that could not be 
trusted and should not be supported” (cited in Kukah, 1999: 156) 
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While the Bafyau-led NLC continued to “do business” with the regime and defended its 
policies, agitation amongst shop floor workers and students continued to increase. 
Indeed by 1992, from Lagos to Sokoto and Port Harcourt to Maiduguri, Nigeria became 
littered with industrial action – these strike actions proved decisive as Nigeria prepared 
for the June 1993 Presidential Elections. 
 
While it was reined-in by the military in the course of a painful socio-economic change, 
the NLC proved relatively assertive, at least in a different context – democratic struggle. 
That is not to claim, however, that the labour was incredibly “united” during in the 
course of democratic struggle. Indeed, the period appeared to draw labour’s image to the 
mud of partisan and sectarian politics – an inevitable avalanche in Nigerian politics 
carrying away groups and individuals. Nevertheless, the events following the annulment 
of the June 12, 1993 Presidential Elections revealed that the NLC leadership was 
compelled by shop floor pressure to take anti-regime action, including strike action. A 
middle-aged female respondent still working in a federal ministry, one of few women 
labour activists in a domain dominated by men, described how the NLC’s style of 
engaging the state changed post-June 12: 
 
Babangida and his cronies had many cards to play in our earlier encounters. By 
June 12th, his card had finished and his cookies had crumbled. Things were 
literally falling apart and Babangida was not able to come to terms with the 
damage he had done. He eventually lost control of our Union [NLC] and we 
became part of the angry wild cats who forced him to quit (interview, Abuja, 16th 
August 2003). 
 
Following the regime’s annulment of the election on 26th June, the Central Working 
Committee (CWC) of the NLC met in Lagos on 28th and issued a critique of the regime’s 
decision to annul the election. It argued that the deepening political crisis was 
exacerbating the severe economic hardships confronting workers and the masses. With 
this declaration, argues Julius Ihonvbere, 
 
The NLC [in particular the CWC] showed that it was opposed to the military, 
supported most of the demands of the pro-democracy groups and other popular 
movement, and was prepared to commit itself to a popular struggle for military 
disengagement from politics and the restoration of democracy (1997: 83). 
 
Subsequently, in July following the meeting of its National Executive Council (NEC) in 
Port Harcourt, the NLC released a list of demands which the Babangida regime was 
asked to meet or risk a general workers’ strike. The Congress noted that the country 
could not afford another round of “costly, expensive and time consuming” elections 
(suggested by the military) and its attendant wastages, and, therefore, demanded the 
immediate release of the annulled presidential election results (Sunday Concord, 
16/6/1993). On July 9th, the NLC issued a strike notice in which it gave the military 
regime a 12-day ultimatum demanding the immediate release of Chief Mashood Abiola, 
the acclaimed winner of the election. It also called for cessation of politically-motivated 
arrests and detentions which the military began after June 12. The regime failed to meet 
these demands and, instead, invited the NLC for a dialogue. In a subsequent declaration 
released on August 15th, the NLC reiterated its determination to embark on the strike if 
the regime did not quit by August 27th. It also called for the “proclamation of the 1989 
constitution and transfer of power to the senate” (Adewumi and Adesina, 1999: 56).   
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On August 27th 1993, General Babangida was forced to resign in the face of mass action 
led by the NLC. However, rather than conceding to NLC and popular demands, the 
regime handed over power to an Interim National Government (ING) – and not to the 
House of Senate as demanded by NLC. The NLC and its affiliates rejected the ING and 
directed all its members and affiliates to embark on a national strike against the ING 
with effect from August 28th. The NLC insisted that the leader of ING, Chief Ernest 
Shonekan, must hand over power to the Senate, in line with the provisions of the 1989 
Constitution.   
 
The key point that emerges from the above account is that the NLC was able to present 
an enduring front for anti-state, pro-democratic action. However, the nascent triumph 
was far from a cause for celebration. The resignation of General Babangida signalled a 
more challenging period for the NLC, not least because democracy was far from sight – 
it took another military regime and eight more years of austerity, repression and struggle 
(during the Abacha Junta, 1994-98) before democracy was eventually restored in may 
1999. Throughout the struggle, the NLC gained and lost the confidence of its members 
and other Nigerians, but nevertheless provided perhaps the most formidable front for 
democratic struggle (see Ihonvbere, 1997). Indeed when the NLC was weighed down by 
internal setbacks, workers’ struggles were carried on by the strategic oil sector unions, in 
particular, the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and 
the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN), with all its 
associated risks.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This article reveals that the Nigerian labour movement is at the forefront of Nigerian 
civil society, and struggles for democratic restoration and consolidation. It questions 
neoliberal claim which emphasises non-partisan stance is sine qua non for a genuine pro-
democracy movement, and arrogates the sagacity for such struggle to civic non-
governmental organisations. The Nigerian labour movement defies both prescriptions. In 
the first place, the Nigerian Labour Movement has always maintained partisan position in 
national politics and public policy; it had even ventured into the establishment of 
workers’ political party, albeit not so successfully. In the second place, and despite its 
partisan stance, the Nigerian labour movement had played a tremendous role in the 
struggles for democratic restoration both during military rule and in the current 
democratic dispensation. In doing so, it served as a forerunner to pro-democracy civic 
organisations which emerged in the 1980s to reinforce the democratic struggles of the 
NLC. 
 
Today, the Nigerian Labour movement occupies a respectable place in the country’s civil 
society. This is partly because its “veteran” status as an organisation known for anti-state 
struggles. Though there is debate on its democratic credentials and even its efficacy to 
fight the state, the Nigerian labour movement is seen one of the most developed, but 
also divided and hierarchical, social movement. Its consistent but controversial profile in 
engaging the state on wide range of issues – workers rights, public welfare, human rights, 
democratisation etc – has been characterised by both success and failure. As revealed in 
the case of Nigeria, the emergence of the state through colonialism and capitalist 
penetration meant that the state emerged as an organ, in the hands of colonialists, and 
later the domestic petty-bourgeoisie, for class control. It also meant that the state played 
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a key role in reproducing socio-economic and political inequality and generating, in the 
process, anti-state, anti-hegemonic activity from the Labour Movement.  
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